Introduction
The Air Force has made significant efforts to improve its force protection capabilities since the Khobar Towers attack in June 1996, but terrorism and other threats continue to pose substantial dangers. The Air Force can further enhance its antiterrorism program by improving intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) support to force protection. This paper examines current force protection intelligence and CI efforts, and proposes specific measures to improve the collection and analysis of force protection intelligence.
It begins by exploring the role of intelligence and CI in force protection, and discusses the current Air Force Intelligence and CI structure. The paper also examines previous anti-DoD terrorist attacks to determine if they provide lessons learned for the Air Force. Next, it reviews current Air Force intelligence and CI doctrine, and proposes measures to improve the Air Force's ability to collect force protection intelligence and investigate force protection threats. Finally, the paper discusses how the Air Force can improve its ability to conduct all-source analysis of force protection intelligence.
Background
Some Air Force personnel erroneously believe that force protection is a physical security program managed by Security Forces (SF) personnel. Although physical security plays a highly visible role in force protection, it is only one part of the overall effort. Air Force force protection doctrine recognizes force protection efforts must be threat driven. This doctrine requires commanders to identify force protection threats, and determine vulnerabilities before implementing protective measures. 1 
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Intelligence and CI personnel play a key role in helping commanders identify threats and assess vulnerabilities.
The Role of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in Force Protection
The collection and analysis of intelligence on the capabilities, intentions, strategy, and tactics employed by terrorists or saboteurs improves force protection efforts by enabling commanders to tailor offensive and defensive measures to the specific threat.
Protecting critical information regarding defense plans, the layout of US installations, specific security measures, and the strengths and weaknesses of security forces can also enhance security. These activities make it more difficult for potential adversaries to collect information needed to develop terrorist or sabotage operations. 2 To understand the distinct roles of intelligence and CI in force protection, you must first understand the difference between these disciplines. DoD Directive 5240. 1, DoD Intelligence Activities, states DoD intelligence agencies collect, produce and disseminate both foreign intelligence and CI. This directive provides the following definitions:
Foreign intelligence. Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.
Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs. 3 These definitions show that both foreign intelligence and CI play a role in countering terrorist threats. Several US intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), collect and analyze both foreign intelligence and CI information. 4 For these agencies, the overlapping roles foreign intelligence and CI play in identifying and countering terrorist threats cause no confusion or consternation. The Air Force Intelligence structure lacks this simplicity.
Air Force Intelligence and Counterintelligence Structure
Within the Air Force, responsibility for foreign intelligence and CI rests within different organizations with different structures, philosophies, traditions, and chains-ofcommand. Air Force Intelligence performs the foreign intelligence mission, while the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) performs the CI mission. This division of responsibility has caused confusion both within and outside the Air Force.
Cooperation between Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI is heavily dependent on personal relationships. When these agencies fail to coordinate, Air Force leaders receive duplicative or even conflicting information on terrorist and other force protection threats.
Combatant command J-2s, especially those from the US Army or Marine Corps, routinely task the Air Force component A-2 to complete CI annexes of operation plans or conduct CI analysis. 5 The Air Force Office of Special Investigations is a federal law enforcement agency, and a component of the DoD Intelligence Community. 6 In addition to performing Air Force CI activities, AFOSI also performs criminal investigations. The command investigates major criminal offenses including violent crime, economic crime, and narcotic violations. 7 Its dual role as both an intelligence and law enforcement agency provides AFOSI powerful authorities to counter both international and domestic threats.
AFI 31-210, The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program
Standards, recognizes the need for both Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI to participate in force protection efforts, and assigns these organizations the following responsibilities:
Headquarters AFOSI has primary responsibility for collection, analysis, dissemination and production of terrorist threat information gathered from local authorities and counterintelligence sources.
Headquarters Air Force Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Air Force/XOI) is responsible for ensuring the timely collection, processing, analysis, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence, current intelligence, and national-level intelligence information concerning terrorist activities, terrorist organizations and force protection issues. These efforts will focus on, but will not be limited to, transnational and state-sponsored entities and organizations. all-source intelligence collection and analysis personnel and resources so that sufficient emphasis is applied to combating terrorism. Analytical expertise must be imbedded, from the national, CINC, and Component Command levels, to the joint task force level.
terrorism-related human intelligence and signals intelligence resources.
resources for the development of language skills that support combating terrorism analysis and collection.
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The commission also noted the importance of service CI programs in force protection efforts and recommended that the SECDEF ensure DoD CI organizations are adequately staffed and funded to meet force protection requirements.
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Analyzing the Lessons Learned from Previous Attacks
The attacks on the Marine Barracks, Khobar Towers, and the USS Cole offer remarkably similar lessons. The commissions chartered to examine these attacks stressed the need to improve the intelligence community's ability to collect force protection intelligence, and stressed the role of HUMINT in identifying terrorist threats. They also documented the need to improve all-source analysis of terrorism information. force protection is supported by all intelligence functions, but is executed primarily through counterintelligence operations and force security measures. To neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of hostile intelligence collection activities, counterintelligence and security are essential. These protect information against espionage, personnel against subversion and terrorism, and installations and material against sabotage. Adversary forces can be expected to use every available means to thwart or otherwise impede the operations of our naval forces. Counterintelligence and security measures aid in identifying our own vulnerabilities and reducing risks, and are essential in achieving surprise during military operations. First, it provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.
The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism. Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. Counterintelligence personnel will normally be part of any deployment, but these agents are forced to develop relationships with US and foreign counterparts in a short period of time. They also lack recent information on the area in which they will be working.
Successful CI collection programs are heavily dependent on liaison relationships with host nation law enforcement and security services, and US Embassy personnel. The Air Force must accept the fact that improving force protection intelligence capabilities will require an additional investment in personnel dedicated to the task.
Dedicating more personnel to the CI collection mission can enhance force protection intelligence collection capabilities, but this is more challenging than simply adding more people to AFOSI. Air Force CI professionals must have the maturity and interpersonal skills to interact with senior foreign and US counterparts. They can enhance their effectiveness by understanding foreign cultures and languages. They must also hold clearances that grant them access to compartmentalized intelligence information.
Although both Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI perform important missions, the Air Force should examine whether its current intelligence and CI structure can meet the demands posed by the current international environment. One option to fill these positions would be to assign company grade officers and mid-level NCOs holding intelligence AFSCs to career broadening assignments as AFOSI Special Agents. These personnel would be required to meet all current AFOSI recruitment standards, and would attend the 11-week Special Investigators Course (SIC).
After completing the SIC, they would be assigned to CI collection or analysis duties.
Intelligence personnel with language skills would be highly desired for these positions.
After completing a four year controlled tour with AFOSI, these personnel would return to the intelligence career field. In addition, the Air Force should assign selected AFOSI personnel to career broadening positions within Air Force Intelligence. This program would offer benefits to AFOSI, Air Force Intelligence, and the Air Force as a whole.
AFOSI would obtain additional personnel, and be able to capitalize on the 
Terrorist Planning Cycles
Force protection analysts must take a strategic, long-term view to identifying force protection threats and predicting terrorist attacks. Terrorists must collect intelligence, train, and conduct detailed planning before carrying out major attacks. Performing these tasks can take years, and it is during this period that intelligence and CI officials have the best opportunity to detect and neutralize threats. The Khobar Towers attack provides an example of a typical planning cycle for a major terrorist attack. The Hizballah operatives believed to have conducted this attack began intelligence collection and planning activities in 1993. They recognized American military personnel were billeted at Khobar
Towers in the fall of 1994, and began regular surveillance of the facility in June 1995.
Planning for the attack continued through March 1996 when Saudi Arabian border guards arrested a Hizballah member attempting to smuggle 38 kilograms of plastic explosive into the country. The subsequent investigation led to the arrest of two additional Hizballah members. Despite this setback, Hizballah leaders were able to recruit replacements for those arrested, and continued planning for the attack. 4 Although it is impossible to determine if an improved force protection intelligence capability would have allowed US officials to counter this attack, hindsight shows that there were at least some opportunities to detect this plot.
Improving Air Force Force Protection Analysis Capabilities
The Air Force should clearly assign the responsibility for analyzing Basic, Level I, and Level II threats to AFOSI, and give the command the resources needed to perform In addition to supporting Air Force units from the MAJCOM or NAF, these units would maintain a deployment capability that would allow them to provide on-the-ground support to major exercise and contingency deployments. These cells would have to possess deployable SCI communication and computer systems and the personnel to build and maintain these links in austere environments.
As well as producing daily summary products and threat assessments, the Air Forcelevel force protection analysis cell and its geographic counterparts would provide direct feedback to AFOSI field collectors. Analysts would be responsible for identifying collection gaps, writing collection emphasis, determining the commander's priority force protection intelligence requirements, and identifying investigative leads and operational opportunities. To succeed in this role, the cell must have the authority to directly task AFOSI field collectors, and monitor on-scene CI investigative and collection support. Storm and Allied Force and have likely come to the conclusion that one way to counter US airpower is to destroy it on the ground before it can launch. The fact that the Iraqis or Serbs failed to utilize unconventional attacks to damage US airpower does not in any way mean that future adversaries will make these same mistakes.
We must face the fact that future enemies could use asymmetrical tactics including terrorist and sabotage attacks against US aircraft, aircrew lodging, and maintenance personnel and facilities in an effort to counter the overwhelming dominance of US airpower. A kill is a kill. It doesn't matter if an enemy terrorist or special operator destroys an aircraft on the ground or an aircraft is destroyed by an enemy surface to air missile or air superiority fighter. The end result is the same. With the destruction of that aircraft, the US has lost combat capability. The Air Force devotes considerable resources to detecting, tracking and analyzing threats to airborne aircraft. It must devote equivalent effort to protecting airpower on the ground.
Terrorism and other force protection threats will continue to endanger Air Force personnel, installations, and resources in the future. Given the expeditionary nature of Air Force operations and the potential that terrorists will obtain access to weapons of mass destruction, we can expect the danger posed by these threats to increase. The US Air Force will not be able to counter asymmetrical threats unless it takes action to strengthen its force protection intelligence doctrine, clarifies the role of AF Intelligence and AFOSI in force protection efforts, removes barriers that prevent full integration of Air Force investigative resources in federal anti-terrorism task forces, and dedicates additional resources to the collection and analysis of intelligence on force protection HUMINT capability in its efforts to counter terrorist and sabotage threats to its forces.
To improve it's HUMINT capabilities, the Air Force should assign additional resources to AFOSI. Current Air Force doctrine assigns responsibility for analyzing force protection threats to Air Force Intelligence and AFOSI. This duplication has caused confusion and resulted in wasted effort. The Air Force should assign AFOSI the responsibility for analyzing force protection threats, and then adequately staff the agency so they can perform this mission.
We will never fully eliminate the threat posed to the Air Force by terrorists or other criminals. Our duties and responsibilities require us to put our people in harm's way, and we cannot accomplish the mission without taking risks. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001) 
